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I     INTRODUCTION 
 
Australia signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’)1 
on 9 December 1998; however, it did not ratify it until three and a half years later, on 1 
July 2002, after implementing legislation to incorporate the Statute’s obligations 
domestically on 27 June 2002.2 Australia follows the dualist approach to international 
law, meaning that treaty obligations do not become applicable in domestic law unless 
these obligations are first implemented through domestic federal law. This process is 
known as transformation.3 Initially, Australia was a strong supporter for the 
establishment of a permanent institution to deal with the actions of senior leaders and 
military figures who had, until this time, largely acted with impunity in regard to crimes 
that seriously offend the international community. However Australia over time began to 
back away from the Rome Statute, taking some time to ratify and upon ratification, 
submitted a declaration in the following terms:  
 
The Government of Australia, having considered the Statute, now hereby ratifies the same, for and 
on behalf of Australia, with the following declaration, the terms of which have full effect in 
Australian law, and which is not a reservation:  
 
1. Australia notes that a case will be inadmissible before the International Criminal Court (the 
Court) where it is being investigated or prosecuted by a State.  
2. Australia reaffirms the primacy of its criminal jurisdiction in relation to crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
3. To enable Australia to exercise its jurisdiction effectively, and fully adhering to its obligations 
under the Statute of the Court, no person will be surrendered to the Court by Australia until it has 
had the full opportunity to investigate or prosecute any alleged crimes.  
4. For this purpose, the procedure under Australian law implementing the Statute of the Court 
provides that no person can be surrendered to the Court unless the Australian Attorney-General 
issues a certificate allowing surrender.  
5. Australian law also provides that no person can be arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued 
by the Court without a certificate from the Attorney-General. 
6. Australia further declares its understanding that the offences in Article 6, 7 and 8 will be 
                                                          
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of Southern Queensland. This paper was written while a Visiting 
Scholar at Kent Law School Canterbury UK. The author would like to thank Professor Wade Mansell and 
colleagues from the Kent Law School together with Dr Anthony Cassimatis of the University of 
Queensland for their thoughtful comments on the paper. All errors are the author’s. 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 
(entered into force 1 July 2002). 
2 International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth); International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) 
Act 2002 (Cth). 
3 See generally Anne Twomey, Procedure and Practice of Entering and Implementing International 
Treaties, Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper No 27 (1995); ‘It is well established that the 
provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless 
those provisions have been validly incorporated into our municipal law by statute. This principle has its 
foundation in the proposition that in our constitutional system the making and ratification of treaties fall 
within the province of the Executive in the exercise of its prerogative power whereas the making and the 
alteration of the law fall within the province of Parliament, not the Executive. So, a treaty which has not 
been incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and 
obligations under that law’: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286–
7 (citations omitted). 
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interpreted and applied in a way that accords with the way they are implemented in Australian 
domestic law.4
 
This qualification – largely brought about by the close personal relationship between the 
then Prime Minister of Australia, Mr John Howard, and his US counterpart, President 
George W Bush,5 and the US reluctance to participate in the new International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’) – presents some serious concerns for Australia’s involvement in the ICC.6 
Mr Howard was quoted in the press as stating:  
 
To enable Australia to exercise its jurisdiction effectively, and fully adhering to its obligations 
under the Statute of the Court, no person will be surrendered to the Court … unless the Australian 
Attorney-General issues a certificate allowing surrender.7   
 
The Rome Statute works with sovereign states through the principle of complementarity. 
This essentially means the ICC will not hear a matter: 
1) over which a state has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute, unless the state is 
unwilling or unable to undertake the investigation or prosecution: art 17(1)(a); 
2) that a state has investigated and decided not to prosecute, unless due to either 
unwillingness or inability to try the matter: art 17(1)(b); 
3) for which the person has already been tried by the state for the same conduct: art 
17(1)(c) ne bis in dem expressed in art 20(3); or 
4) that is not of sufficient gravity to justify action: art 17(1)(d). 
 
This paper considers the operation of the principle of complementarity in the Australian 
jurisdiction in light of its declaration made upon ratification of the Rome Statute, and 
investigates the implications for the operation of the ICC in Australia as a consequence 
of the declaration. Part I introduces the context for the Australian declaration. Part II 
examines the meaning of the declaration in the context of the Rome Statute together with 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’)8 and the 
International Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) Draft Guidelines on the interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention.9 Part III discusses how the Australian declaration is to be interpreted 
under these treaties and the consequences of possible invalidity. Part IV gives particular 
regard to the principle of complementarity reflected in points 1), 2) and 4), above. Lastly, 
Part V considers the role of key gatekeepers such as the ICC Chief Prosecutor and the 
Australian Attorney-General in this process. Australia does not have a proud record in its 
compliance with international obligations.10 The paper concludes that the way forward 
                                                          
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Declaration Text: Australia 1 (July 2002) 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/A255319F58A44982412566E100540E5E?OpenDocument > at 27 
April 2009. 
5 See, Hilary Charlesworth et al, No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law (2007) 80–1.  
6 Alex J Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, ‘Justice Beyond Borders? Australia and the International Criminal 
Court’ (2002) 56 Australian Journal of International Affairs 417, 422.  
7 Gideon Boas ‘An Overview of Implementation by Australia of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 179, 180 fn 2. 
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 2 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 19 
(entered into force 27 January 1980).  
9 For all the reports see International Law Commission, Reservation to Treaties < 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_8.htm > at 20 May 2008.. 
10 See, eg, Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501; See further, Rosalie Balkin, ‘International 
Law and Domestic Law’ in Sam Blay, Ryszard Piotrowicz and Martin Tsamenyi (eds), Public 
International Law: An Australian Perspective, (2nd ed, 2002) 115; Gillian Triggs, ‘Australia’s War Crimes 
Trials: All Pity Choked’ in Timothy H L McCormack and Gerry J Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes: 
National and International Approaches (1997) 123; Bellamy and Hanson, above n 6. 
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for the ICC in the Australian context may not be straightforward. While the changes 
wrought by the implementation of legislation bringing the Rome Statute into operation in 
Australia are largely long overdue and in welcome recognition of human rights standards, 
the road may not be all smooth. 
 
II     THE AUSTRALIAN DECLARATION 
 
An inquiry undertaken by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (‘JSCOT’)11 
asserted the need for Australia to maintain its independent and sovereign status. This 
maintenance of sovereign status was a key concern for those arguing against ratification 
of the Rome Statute and is still the US’ main argument against involvement.12 The 
JSCOT inquiry was heavily politicised and took much longer than most of its other 
inquiries.13 As a consequence, Australia made the declaration outlined above upon its 
ratification of the Rome Statute. Important considerations arise in relation to the impact 
of the declaration and it is one aspect that may well make the operation of the ICC less 
smooth in Australian waters. 
 
The first three paragraphs of the declaration relate to the complementarity principle and 
tend to reaffirm Australia’s concern that it maintains sovereignty over the prosecution of 
its nationals. It has been argued by Amnesty International14 that the declaration in this 
regard is contrary to the ‘object and purpose’ of the Rome Statute, while other 
commentators have seen these paragraphs of the declaration as adding nothing further 
than a restatement of the complementarity principle.15 When Australia first submitted the 
declaration, legal counsel for the United Nations (‘UN’) advised that it was in the nature 
of a reservation. After further discussion the UN Depository conceded to accept the 
declaration: 
 
Hans Corell, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, declined to accept Australia’s 
ratification, claiming that the declaration constituted a reservation to the treaty, which was 
prohibited under the treaty’s terms. … The impasse was eventually resolved when the UN 
depositary gave into a personal plea from Mr Downer to allow the ratification.16
 
A     Treaty Reservations / Declarations? 
                                                          
11 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 45: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2002).  
12 See, eg, Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Sydney, 13 
February 2001, 109 (Gareth John Kimberley): ‘Everyone seems to agree that there is some loss of 
sovereignty involved and that it is just a matter of degree and whether we are prepared to accept it. Some 
have actually said that there is no loss of sovereignty but I cannot accept that. It seems to me that this court 
will indirectly be able to override national governments, and indeed there would be no point in setting up 
the court if it could not’; Jamie Mayerfield, ‘Who shall be Judge? The United States, the International 
Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 93; the 
reliance by the US on any principled argument against the ICC was made much more difficult in March 
2005 when the US abstained on the Security Council vote to extend the ICC’s jurisdiction to investigate 
alleged atrocities in Darfur in the Sudan: Reports of the Security-Council on the Sudan, SC Res 1593, UN 
SCOR, 59th Sess, SC 518th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1593 (2005). 
13 See especially, Charlesworth et al, above n 5, 71–82, for a full discussion of the politicisation of the 
implementation of the Rome Statute in Australia. 
14 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: Declarations amounting to prohibited reservations 
to the Rome Statute, 24 November 2005, IOR 40/032/2005, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45be009d2.html > at 27 April 2009. 
15 Gillian Triggs, ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A quiet 
Revolution in Australian Law’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 507. 
16 Charlesworth et al, above n 5, 80.  
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As Triggs comments: 
 
In formulating its recommendation, JSCOT was careful to use the word ‘declare’ rather 
than, for example, ‘reserves’. This was for good reason… With the single exception of 
[the] transitional clause, the Statute prohibits reservations to the treaty. Any statement by 
Australia regarding its understanding of the nature of the legal obligations under the 
Statute could not therefore constitute a formal reservation, prompting the question – what 
is the legal status of a declaration or understanding at international law?17
 
This is a key question and one that may lead to the stormy waters alluded to earlier. As 
far back as 1951 the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in an advisory opinion clearly 
laid out that a treaty reservation was permitted, so long as the treaty itself did not prohibit 
reservations and the reservation did not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.18
 
It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and the purpose of 
the Convention that must furnish the criterion to determine the attitude of the State which 
makes the reservation and of the State which objects.19
 
1     The Rome Statute 
 
Article 120 of the Rome Statute clearly prohibits the making of any reservations and this 
is reinforced by art 19(a) of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, if the Australian 
declaration is really in the nature of a reservation it is prohibited and is not something 
that requires an objection. The only exception, if it can be so called, in the Rome Statute 
to this prohibition on reservations is the transitional provision, introduced at the behest of 
the French delegation, which relates to war crimes.20 The significance of the prohibition 
on reservations is reinforced by the nature of the instrument: the Rome Statute is referred 
to as a ‘statute’ because it establishes a new international judicial institution and it is thus 
not like an ordinary multilateral treaty. It is a constitutive treaty creating what many 
considered the missing link in the United Nations operations – a permanent international 
criminal court. The Statute not only deals with the mechanistic provisions of the ICC, but 
also with substantive crimes, and in this regard can be seen as a hybrid normative human 
rights treaty, setting out rights for third parties, including victims and witnesses, and 
importantly also the rights of the accused. 
 
2     The Vienna Convention: Prohibited Reservations: art 19(a) 
 
The Vienna Convention deals with reservations in arts 19–23. The position stated by the 
ICJ in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion)21 was adopted in the codification of the customary law by 
the Vienna Convention. Articles 1(d) and 19 are of particular relevance: 
 
Article 1(d). ‘[R]eservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
                                                          
17 Triggs, above n 15, 512–13 (citations omitted). 
18 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 24. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Rome Statute art 124; see also Triggs, above n 15, 512. 
21 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1915] ICJ Rep 15. 
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whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to the State. 
 
Article 19. A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, formulate a reservation unless: 
a. The reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
b. The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the 
reservation in question, may be made; or 
c. In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.22
 
However, gaps and uncertainties in application exist and are the subject of consideration 
by the ILC.23 In 1994 the ILC appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate and report 
on reservations to treaties.24 The special rapporteur, Mr Alain Pellet, has so far presented 
12 reports on the subject.25 The aim of the ILC is not to change the Vienna Convention 
but rather to provide a guide to practice with respect to reservations. The Vienna 
Convention provides no specific guidance on the distinction between reservations and 
declarations; however, the general position in relation to reservations and declarations is 
that the classification by the reserving or declaring state as one or the other is irrelevant: 
 
It is not always easy to distinguish a reservation from a declaration as to a State’s 
understanding of the interpretation of a provision, or from a statement of policy. Regard 
will be had to the intention of the State, rather than the form of the instrument. If a 
statement, irrespective of its name or title, purports to exclude or modify the legal effect 
of a treaty in its application to the State, it constitutes a reservation.26
  
Irrespective of the name given to a statement made by a ratifying state, what is important 
is the declaration’s substantive effect as perceived by other parties or the organisation 
established by the instrument. If another state party or the constituent organ considers a 
declaration as effectively a reservation, altering the legal effect of the treaty, then it is 
considered a reservation that is prohibited by art 19 (a) of the Vienna Convention and art 
120 of the Rome Statute. In such a situation no objection from another state party is 
required.  
 
                                                          
22 Vienna Convention arts 1(d), 19. 
23 ‘The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/31 of 9 December 1993, endorsed the decision of the 
Commission to include in its agenda the topic “The law and practice relating to reservations to treaties”’: 
Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth Session, UN GAOR, 62nd sess, Supp No 10, [34], 
UN Doc A/62/10, (2007). 
24 International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, UN GAOR, 49th sess, Supp No 10, 
[381], UN Doc A/49/10 (1994).  
25See, ILC, above n 9; See generally International Law Commission Summaries: Reservations to Treaties 
(2005) UN ILC <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_8.htm> at 27 April 2009.  
26 General Comment No 24: Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the 
Covenant, UN HRC, 52nd sess, [3], UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) –  while this comment is by 
the Human Rights Committee in relation to human rights treaties it is applicable to treaties generally; see 
Alain Pellet, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties: Addendum, ILC, UN GAOR, 50th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/491/Add.6 (1998).  
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The role of the UN depositary is relevant in this regard. The obligations upon the 
depositary are set out in art 77(2) of the Vienna Convention and are considered to be 
relatively passive in effect.27
 
In the event of any difference appearing between a State and the depositary as to the 
performance of the latter’s functions, the depositary shall bring the question to the 
attention of the signatory States and the contracting States or, where appropriate, of the 
competent organ of the international organization concerned.28
 
The role of the depositary – which is the focus of draft guideline 2.1.729 – has been 
commented on by the special rapporteur, favouring current practice, ‘whereby the 
depositary refused to accept a reservation prohibited by the treaty itself’. As noted above, 
legal counsel to the UN at first rejected the Australian declaration as being a reservation, 
but after further discussions with the then Minister for Foreign Affairs was persuaded to 
accept the instrument.30 It is unlikely that Australia could successfully argue that its 
declaration cannot be a prohibited reservation simply by virtue of the depositary’s 
acceptance of the instrument. An international court interpreting the Australian 
declaration would not, for example, be bound by the depositary’s interpretation of the 
instrument. Of course, if all the parties to the treaty and the depositary interpret the 
instrument in exactly the same way then it is extremely unlikely that a court would depart 
from that interpretation. 
 
3     The ILC Draft Guidelines (Reservations and Declarations) 
 
In the ILC Draft Guidelines accepted by the Drafting Committee at its 2597th meeting, 
the following relevant guidelines (set out in full) elucidate what a reservation is 
(emphasis added): 
 
1.1.1 Object of reservations 
A reservation purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a 
treaty or of the treaty as a whole, with respect to certain specific aspects in their 
application to the State or to the international organization which formulates the 
reservation. 
 
1.1.5 Statements purporting to limit the obligations of their author 
 A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization at the time 
when that State or that organization expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty by 
which its author purports to limit the obligations imposed on it by the treaty constitutes a 
reservation. 
 
1.1.6 Statements purporting to discharge an obligation by equivalent means 
 A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when that 
State or that organization expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty by which that 
State or that organization purports to discharge an obligation pursuant to the treaty in a 
                                                          
27 International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth Session, above n 23; some parties considered the depositary 
has a role with regard to the rejection of an instrument containing a reservation prohibited under art 19(a) 
of the Vienna Convention. 
28 Vienna Convention art 77(2). 
29 International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth Session, above n 23, [153].  
30 Charlesworth et al, above n 5, 80 fn 36. 
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manner different from but equivalent to that imposed by the treaty constitutes a 
reservation.31
 
The following guidelines proposed at the same meeting assist in understanding what 
comprises a declaration (emphasis added):  
 
1.2 Definition of interpretive declarations 
‘Interpretive declaration’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made 
by a State or by an international organization whereby that State or that organization 
purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty 
or to certain of its provisions. 
 
1.2.1 Conditional interpretative declarations 
A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when 
signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or 
by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or 
international organization subordinates its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific 
interpretation of the treaty or of certain provisions thereof, shall constitute a conditional 
interpretative declaration.32
 
At the very least if the declaration by Australia is not a reservation it is arguably a 
conditional interpretive declaration. This is distinct from an interpretive declaration, 
which has no legal consequences. The proposed guidelines distinguish between the two 
in the different consequences that each entails. Examples of a simple interpretive 
declaration under the Rome Statute include instruments submitted by New Zealand and 
Sweden in which those states sought to clarify ambiguity with regard to the position of 
nuclear weapons.33
 
The question arises: can a state couch a non-permitted reservation as a declaration? In 
Belilos v Switzerland34 the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) evaluated an 
interpretive declaration in relation to art 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court approached the assessment in the same 
way as it would for a reservation, requiring a substantive assessment: ‘In order to 
establish the legal character of such a declaration, one must look behind the title given to 
                                                          
31 Law and Practice Relating to Treaties: Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2597th mtg, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.575 (1999).  
32 Ibid [213]. 
33 See, eg, ‘Declaration: 1. The Government of New Zealand notes that the majority of the war crimes 
specified in article 8 of the Rome Statute, in particular those in articles 8 (2)(b)(i)–(v) and 8 (2)(e)(i)–(iv) 
(which relate to various kinds of attacks on civilian targets), make no reference to the type of the weapons 
employed to commit the particular crime. The Government of New Zealand recalls that the fundamental 
principle that underpins international humanitarian law is to mitigate and circumscribe the cruelty of war 
for humanitarian reasons and that, rather than being limited to weaponry of an earlier time, this branch of 
law has evolved, and continues to evolve, to meet contemporary circumstances. Accordingly, it is the view 
of the Government of New Zealand that it would be inconsistent with principles of international 
humanitarian law to purport to limit the scope of article 8, in particular article 8 (2)(b), to events that 
involve conventional weapons only’: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Declaration Text: 
New Zealand, 7 October 1998, 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/6FEC50D1DC1A7371412566BB003AB0E1?OpenDocument> at 27 
April 2009.  
34 Belilos v Switzerland (1988) 10 EHRR 466 (‘Belilos’). 
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it and seek to determine the substantive content.’35 The Court found the declaration to be 
a reservation.36
 
The guidelines provide further assistance when considering whether an instrument is a 
reservation or a declaration (emphasis added): 
 
1.3 Distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations 
To determine whether a unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international 
organization in respect of a treaty is a reservation or an interpretative declaration, it is 
appropriate to ascertain the purpose of its author by interpreting the statement in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms, in light of the 
treaty to which it refers. Due regard shall be given to the intention of the State or the 
international organization concerned at the time the statement was formulated.37
 
Where a statement may present as a declaration or a prohibited reservation, the 
guidelines state (emphasis added): 
 
1.3.2 Formulation of a unilateral statement when a reservation is prohibited 
When a treaty prohibits reservations to all or certain of its provisions, a unilateral 
statement formulated in respect thereof by a State or an international organization shall 
be presumed not to constitute a reservation except when it is established that it purports 
to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty or of specific 
aspects of the treaty as a whole, in their application to its author. 
 
1.4.5 Statements concerning modalities of implementation of a treaty at the 
international level 
 A unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization whereby 
that State or that organization indicates the manner in which it intends to implement a 
treaty at the internal level, without purporting as such to affect the rights and obligations 
of the other Contracting Parties, constitutes an informative statement which is outside 
the scope of the present Guide to Practice.38
 
In this regard it seems that Australia’s intention is that the statement is to be taken as an 
interpretive declaration and not a reservation. An international judicial body faced with 
interpretation of the Australian declaration would begin by trying to interpret it 
consistently with the ICC Statute. This idea was expressed by the ICJ in the Rights of 
Passage case: 
 
It is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, 
be interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with 
existing law and not in violation of it.39
 
However, giving the words their ordinary meaning raises significant issues with regard 
both to legal effect and vagueness (the latter discussed below). The ‘purpose of the 
author’ and ‘good faith’ aspect has to be considered in light of the intentions of the State 
                                                          
35 ‘However, the Court must see to it that the obligations arising under the Convention are not subject to 
restrictions which would not satisfy the requirements of Article 64 as regards reservations. Accordingly, it 
will examine the validity of the interpretative declaration in question, as in the case of a reservation, in the 
context of this provision.’: ibid [49]. 
36 Ibid [60]. 
37 Law and Practice Relating to Treaties, above n 32, [213]. 
38 Ibid [213]–[14]. 
39 Right of Passage Case (Portugal v India) (Preliminary Objections) [1957] ICJ Rep 125, 142. 
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at the time; this can be assessed from the statements made by the Prime Minister and the 
JSCOT inquiry.40 The effect of guidelines 1.3.2 and 1.4.5, above, are determined by 
addressing the central question: does the statement affect the rights of other states or the 
international organisation? In this regard art 21(1) of the Vienna Convention is relevant. 
It provides: 
 
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with Articles 19, 
20 and 23: 
(a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions of 
the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and 
(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with 
the reserving State. 
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the 
treaty inter se. 
 
Article 21(1)(b) raises the question of the meaning of the Australian declaration in 
relation to the Attorney-General’s exercise of discretion. If other signatory states to the 
Rome Statute are taken as accepting the Australian declaration, are they also entitled to 
determine internally whether an accused can be arrested or surrendered to the ICC? If the 
Australian declaration achieves this then it seriously undermines the operation of the 
Statute. Such an interpretation is however unlikely given arts 120 and 124 (transitional 
provision exception in regard to art 8) of the Rome Statute. To effectively alter the 
operation of the Statute to this extent, allowing states to determine whether they will 
arrest and surrender alleged criminals pursuant to a request from the ICC, would 
substantially alter the intent of the Rome Statute and the parties would need to clarify this 
by a clear amendment to the Statute. To this extent it is suggested that the Australian 
declaration falls under guideline 1.3.2, rather than 1.4.5, in that it modifies the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty. 
 
The Rome Statute could not be clearer in its statement in art 120 that reservations are not 
permitted. The straightforward argument relies on establishing the declaration as either 
an instrument that purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of the Rome Statute, in 
which case it is a reservation and is prohibited by art 120, or as one that does not, in 
which case it is an end to the need to further assess Australia’s obligations under the 
treaty. However, if the declaration is not seen as coming under art 19(a) of the Vienna 
Convention, then in light of the ILC Draft Guidelines, it could arguably still fall under art 
19(c) of the Vienna Convention. In such circumstances it could be considered to be a 
conditional interpretive declaration (guideline 1.2.1) and as such incompatible with the 
‘object and purpose of the treaty,’ making it effectively a reservation. 
 
B     Object and Purpose 
 
Key questions that arise in assessing whether, as a declaration, the statement offends 
‘object and purpose’ in art 19(c) of the Vienna Convention include: 1) how to determine 
the object and purpose of the treaty; 2) what would be the effect of a decision by the 
constituent organ of incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the 
treaty; and 3) if the reservation/declaration is declared incompatible: is it severable, and 
does the declaring state retain the status of a contracting party? 
 
                                                          
40 Boas, above n 7; Charlesworth et al, above n 5.  
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There is agreement in the current work on treaty reservations that the objective criteria 
and methodology to determine the object and purpose of the treaty has been left 
ambiguous by the Vienna Convention.41 This is partly due to the need to avoid the 
rigidity of a system of unanimity and accommodate the greatest possible state accession 
to multilateral treaties.  
 
With regard to the assessment of object and purpose, the 10th report addendum by the 
special rapporteur to the ILC acknowledges that it is ultimately a subjective phrase 
lacking in methodological specification but which nonetheless provides a guideline for 
resolving most conundrums, much like the term ‘reasonable person’ in domestic law.  
 
At most, one can infer that a fairly general approach is required: it is not a question of 
‘dissecting’ the treaty in minute detail and examining its provisions one by one, but of 
extracting the ‘essence’, the overall ‘mission’ of the treaty…42  
 
The process adopted by the courts (not unlike the common law domestic approach to 
statutory interpretation) was noted by the special rapporteur:  
 
it may be observed that the Court has deduced the object and purpose of a treaty:  
 From its title; 
 From its preamble; 
 From an article placed at the beginning of the treaty that ‘must be regarded as fixing 
an objective, in light of which the other treaty provisions are to be interpreted and 
applied’; 
 From an article of the treaty that demonstrates ‘the major concern of each contracting 
party’ when it concluded the treaty; 
 From the preparatory work on the treaty; and 
 From its overall framework.43 
 
The special rapporteur acknowledges that this does not amount to a ‘method’ and in fact 
no suitable ‘method’ has been established. Deducing a treaty’s object and purpose 
ultimately rests on interpretation as described in arts 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
A draft guideline was proposed by the special rapporteur as follows (emphasis added): 
 
3.1.5.     Definition of the object and purpose of the treaty 
For the purpose of assessing the validity of reservations, the object and purpose of the 
treaty means the essential provisions of the treaty, which constitute its raison d’être.44
                                                          
41 Vienna Convention, art 19(c); see also Alain Pellet, Tenth Report of on Reservations to Treaties: 
Addendum, ILC, UN GAOR, 57th sess, 2856th mtg, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (2005).. 
42 Ibid [77]. 
43 Ibid [81] (citations omitted). 
44 Ibid [89]; cf ‘In the view of some members of the Commission, the “threshold” has been set too high in 
draft guideline 3.1.5 and may well unduly facilitate the formulation of reservations. Most members, 
however, have taken the view that by definition any reservation “purports to exclude or modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in 
their application” to the author of the reservation and that the definition of the object and purpose of the 
treaty should not be so broad as to impair the capacity to formulate reservations. By limiting the 
incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty to cases in which (i) it impairs 
an essential element, (ii) [is] necessary to the general thrust of the treaty, (iii) thereby compromising the 
raison d’être of the treaty, the formulation in draft guideline 3.1.5 strikes an acceptable balance between 
the need to preserve the integrity of the treaty and the concern to facilitate the broadest possible 
participation in multilateral conventions.’: Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth 
Session, above n 23, [13] (citations omitted).  
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Reference to ‘raison d’être’ draws inspiration from the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion: 
‘none of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair ... the purpose and raison 
d’être of the convention’.45  
 
Looking to the Preamble of the Rome Statute and the debates it is clear that its raison 
d’être is to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished’.46 This phrase is used twice in the 
Preamble and again in arts 1 and 5 of the Rome Statute. The purpose of the Rome Statute 
is to achieve state cooperation in ensuring the perpetrators of serious crimes, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, are dealt with through criminal 
justice proceedings, preferably at the national level, but, failing this, before the ICC. 
Article 86 specifies the general obligation on state parties to fully cooperate with the 
ICC. An essential aspect to the cooperation is the requirement of a state party to arrest 
and surrender a person ‘immediately’47 upon request to do so. 
 
It follows that were Australia to fail to investigate and prosecute an alleged offender, as 
required by the Rome Statute, then a statement that permits a national official, such as the 
Attorney-General, to determine in their ‘absolute discretion’ not to arrest or surrender 
such a person when requested by the ICC would clearly defeat the object and purpose – 
the raison d’être – of the Rome Statute.   
 
C     Vague and Uncertain Reservations/ Declarations 
 
Reservations will offend the object and purpose requirement of art 19(c) of the Vienna 
Convention if they are too general, vague or uncertain. That this applies to declarations 
too is clear from the observation that: 
 
Thailand’s interpretative declaration to the effect that it ‘does not interpret and apply the 
provisions of this Convention [the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination] as imposing upon the Kingdom of Thailand any 
obligation beyond the confines of [its] Constitution and [its] laws’ also prompted an 
objection on the part of Sweden that, in so doing, Thailand was making the application of 
the Convention subject to a general reservation which makes reference to the limits of 
national legislation the content of which was not specified.48
 
So the question as to whether a declaration is effectively a reservation also includes an 
assessment as to the instrument’s legal clarity, so that other contracting states can know 
the extent of a reservation or declaration’s scope, and its legal effect, to determine 
whether it is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  
 
The exercise of the Attorney-General’s discretion is not prescribed by any criteria.49 
While it is ultimately subject to review by the High Court under Australian constitutional 
                                                          
45 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 21. 
46 Rome Statute Preamble [4], [9]. 
47 Rome Statute art 59(1). 
48 See Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth Session above n 23, [110] (citations 
omitted). 
49 ICC Act 2002 (Cth) ss 22, 29. 
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and administrative law principles,50 this provides no clear indication to other state 
parties, nor to the ICC, as to how and when the Attorney-General may exercise the 
discretion. This does not enable another state party to the Rome Statute to clearly assess 
the full scope and effect of the Australian declaration.  
  
While it is clear the Australian declaration is referring to the duty to arrest and surrender 
it can never be clear as to how and when those duties will be carried out in Australia, 
given it is based on the exercise of an absolute discretion. The extent to which Australia 
accepts the obligations contained in arts 59 and 86 of the Rome Statute are therefore 
indeterminate. The case of Belilos51 is instructive in this context. Here the interpretative 
declaration made by the Government of Switzerland was found too vague to comply with 
art 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights:  
 
By ‘reservation of a general character’ in Article 64 is meant in particular a reservation 
couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact 
meaning and scope. While the preparatory work and the Government’s explanations 
clearly show what the respondent State’s concern was at the time of ratification, they 
cannot obscure the objective reality of the actual wording of the declaration. The words 
‘ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public authorities 
relating to [civil] rights or obligations or the determination of [a criminal] charge’ do not 
make it possible for the scope of the undertaking by Switzerland to be ascertained 
exactly, in particular as to which categories of dispute are included and as to whether or 
not the ‘ultimate control by the judiciary’ takes in the facts of the case. … In short, they 
fall foul of the rule that reservations must not be of a general character.52
 
In Belilos the ECHR was prepared to find the declaration was effectively a reservation. 
This was also the case in Loizidou v Turkey.53 The ECHR held that Turkey’s declaration 
under art 25 of the European Convention of Human Rights was invalid, and that the 
invalid parts could be severed from the original declaration. The ECHR adopted the 
following approach: 
 
To determine whether Contracting Parties may impose restrictions on their acceptance of 
the competence of the Commission and Court under arts 25 and 46, the Court will seek to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of these provisions in their context 
and in the light of their object and purpose.54
 
The ICJ has noted that the ‘laissez-faire’ approach of states in both making and objecting, 
or not, to reservations is not one that the ECHR and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights support in their jurisprudence.55 This raises the question: what is the state of 
Australia’s declaration vis-à-vis other contracting parties, none of whom have raised an 
objection to the Australian declaration? While the Rome Statute is considered a 
constitutive treaty setting up a mechanism for trial of individuals for crimes under 
                                                          
50 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 539–540 (‘Tampa’); See Chris Finn, ‘The Justiciability of 
Administrative Decisions: A redundant Concept?’(2002) 30 Federal Law Review 239; cf, John McMillan, 
‘The Justiciability of the Government's Tampa Actions’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review 89; see further, 
below n 97. It is unlikely the High Court would interfere in the exercise of such a discretionary power. 
51 Belilos v Switzerland (1988) 10 EHRR 466. 
52 Ibid [55]. 
53 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) ECHR A310. 
54 Ibid [73]. 
55 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Jurisdiction; Admissibility)  
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) [2006] ICJ, joint separate opinion by Higgins, Kooijmans, 
Elaraby, Owada and Simma JJ (3 Feb), 65, [15]. 
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international law, others have suggested it is a hybrid normative human rights treaty, 
containing individual’s specific rights.56
 
The Human Rights Committee have stated: 
 
Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that the Committee, those under the 
jurisdiction of the reserving State and other States parties may be clear as to what 
obligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken. Reservations 
may thus not be general, but must refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and 
indicate in precise terms its scope in relation thereto.57  
 
Furthermore, in relation to human rights treaties the argument can be made that objection 
or not by contracting parties is irrelevant to the outcome of a reservation. 
 
 D     Special Considerations in Relation to Human Rights Treaties 
 
The Human Rights Committee has commented that human rights treaties hold a different 
position to that of other multilateral treaties under the Vienna Convention: 
 
State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of 
reservations to human rights treaties. Such treaties … are not a web of inter-State 
exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with 
rights. … And because the operation of the classic rules on reservations is so inadequate 
for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal interest in or need to object to 
reservations. The absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either 
compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. Objections 
have been occasional, made by some States but not others, and on grounds not always 
specified; when an objection is made, it often does not specify a legal consequence, or 
sometimes even indicates that the objecting party none the less does not regard the 
Covenant as not in effect as between the parties concerned. In short, the pattern is so 
unclear that it is not safe to assume that a non-objecting State thinks that a particular 
reservation is acceptable.58
 
The position with regard to an invalid reservation to a human rights treaty is that it is of 
no effect: it is null and void. Some argue that an invalid reservation is not something that 
states can choose to accept nor to which they can object.59 This position leads to the 
same result as the argument made above regarding a reservation under art 19(a) of the 
Vienna Convention, and it reinforces the prohibition of reservations under art 120 of the 
Rome Statue.  
 
While reservations to human rights treaties ought to be avoided, state practice does not 
observe this in all cases. The ILC Draft Guidelines acknowledge the special difficulties 
surrounding reservations to human rights treaties but do not believe state practice 
supports the blanket invalidity of any reservation to a human rights treaty and so provide: 
 
3.1.12      Reservations to general human rights treaties 
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a general 
treaty for the protection of human rights, account shall be taken of the indivisibility, 
                                                          
56 Amnesty International, above n 14, 8. 
57 General Comment No 24, above, Pellet n 42 [113]. 
58 General Comment No 24, above Pellet n 42 [17]. 
59 Alain Pellet, Meeting with Human Rights Bodies, ILC, 59th sess, UN Doc ILC (LIX)/RT/CRP.1 (2007). 
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interdependence and interrelatedness of the rights set out in the treaty as well as the 
importance that the right or provision which is the subject of the reservation has within 
the general thrust of the treaty, and the gravity of the impact the reservation has upon it.60
 
Bodies charged with monitoring such treaties, or established by the instrument, are 
competent to decide whether a reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of 
the treaty.61 An ICJ Advisory Opinion in 1949 found that where a group of states 
establish an international organisation by multilateral treaty, the organisation has 
independent legal personality in relation to the states.62 With human rights treaties the 
question of objection to a declaration or reservation is really one for the body established 
by the instrument – in this case the competent organ under the Rome Statute – to 
determine based on objective criteria.63 In relation to the Rome Statute, its very nature is 
such that the position concerning the requirement of objections by other states is largely 
irrelevant. The Rome Statute is a treaty that not only establishes an international court, 
setting out its organisational structure and operational provisions, but that also contains 
the substantive provisions setting up the specific material obligations of state parties, the 
organisation and rights of the accused, victims and witnesses. The special rapporteur has 
argued therefore that art 20(3) of the Vienna Convention should not apply because of the 
hybrid nature and presence of the material provisions in the Statute.64 It can be argued 
that the fact a number of states have objected to Uruguay’s ‘declaration’65 under the 
Rome Statute does not mean other States’ declarations are therefore accepted. In human 
rights treaties, unlike a multilateral treaty, states’ reciprocal rights are not directly 
threatened and often in practice no objection is made even if a state may see the 
reservation or declaration as objectionable.66
 
                                                          
60 Reservations To Treaties, ILC, UN GAOR, 59th sess, 3, UN Doc A/Cn.4/L.705 (2007); see also the 
recent ICJ decision, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Jurisdiction; 
Admissibility) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) [2006] ICJ (3 Feb), 55, [64]–[70]. 
61 International Law Commission: Report on the Work of its Fifty-eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 
Supp No 10, [152] UN Doc A/61/10 (2006): ‘The Special Rapporteur had noted with satisfaction that no 
member had disputed the principle that States or international organizations had competence to assess the 
validity of a reservation.’ 
62 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), [1949] ICJ Rep 
174, 179.  
63 Pellet, Meeting with Human Rights Bodies, above n 61, [21]: ‘Nevertheless, in practice it was generally 
considered that even invalid reservations were subject to the general regime of reservations and could 
therefore be accepted by other contracting States.’ 
64 Alain Pellet, Twelfth Report on Reservations to Treaties, ILC, UN GAOR, 59th sess [251]–[256] UN Doc 
A/CN.4/584 (2007). 
65 See, eg, Germany stated: ‘The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers that the 
Interpretative Declaration with regard to the compatibility of the rules of the Statute with the provisions of 
the Constitution of Uruguay is in fact a reservation that seeks to limit the scope of the Statute on a 
unilateral basis. As it is provided in article 120 of the Statute that no reservation may be made to the 
Statute, this reservation should not be made.’: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Germany: 
Objection to the Interpretative Declaration Made by Uruguay Upon Ratification, Depositary Notification, 
UN Doc CN.784.TREATIES-7 (2003); Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom objected on similar grounds. 
66In Belilos, the Court stated with respect to the lack of objections from other state parties, ‘[t]he silence of 
the depositary and the Contracting States does not deprive the Convention institutions of the power to 
make their own assessment’: Belilos (1988) 10 EHRR 466, [47]; see also Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Jurisdiction; Admissibility) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Rwanda) [2006] ICJ (3 Feb), joint separate opinion by Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma JJ, 
65, [10]: ‘the vast majority of States, who the Court in 1951 envisaged would scrutinise and object to such 
reservations, have failed to engage in this task.’  
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The Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
declared the following in relation to human rights treaties and the Vienna Convention: 
 
[The] object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings 
irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other 
contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the states can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume 
various obligations, not in relation to other states, but towards all individuals within their 
jurisdiction.67
 
A final consideration is the position of reservations made in relation to rules of jus 
cogens or pre-emptory norms. 
 
E     Reservations to Jus Cogens and Peremptory Norms 
  
Jus cogens refer to fundamental principles of international law that no state may ignore 
or abrogate by contract, for instance through reservation to treaties dealing with such 
principles. While no definitive list of jus cogens principles exist it is generally accepted 
that the prohibition of genocide is one such principle.68 The Vienna Convention 
introduces jus cogens in art 53: 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm 
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character. 
 
The special rapporteur in his 10th report on reservations provides the following guidelines 
in relation to such reservations: 
 
  3.1.9. Reservations to provisions setting forth a rule of jus cogens 
  A State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation to a 
treaty provision which sets forth a peremptory norm of general international law. 
 3.1.10 Reservations to provisions relating to non-derogable rights 
A State or an international organization may formulate a reservation to a treaty 
provision relating to non-derogable rights provided that the reservation in question is not 
incompatible with the essential rights and obligations arising out of that provision. In 
assessing the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the 
provision in question, account must be taken of the importance which the parties have 
conferred upon the rights at issue by making them non-derogable.69
 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute should override the exercise of an absolute discretion by the 
Attorney-General, who should not be in a position to refuse to issue a certificate arresting 
or surrendering a person who is accused of genocide. Such a crime attracts universal 
                                                          
67 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Advisory Opinion) [1982] ICAHR A2, UN Doc OC-2/82, [29]. 
68 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ Law and 
Contemporary Problems, (1996) 59, 63; Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, ‘The Gender of Jus 
Cogens’, Human Rights Quarterly, (1993)15, 63. 
69 Pellet, above n 42, [146]. 
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jurisdiction and is one that Australia along with all other states should hold as a jus 
cogens principle. In this context Australia ratified the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide70 (on 8 July 1949) and passed the Genocide 
Convention Act 1949.71 Notwithstanding this it was held in the Federal Court that 
genocide was not part of the law in Australia due to the failure of incorporation by the 
legislature.72 This has now been rectified by ratification of the Rome Statute and the 
enactment of the implementing legislation.73 If the Attorney-General refused to surrender 
a requested accused, the ICC would be entitled to activate the complementary principle 
under art 17(1) of the Statute regarding ‘unwillingness’. The effect of this is that the 
person would be protected from prosecution as long as they remained on Australian 
territory. If the accused moved outside Australia they would be subject to either universal 
jurisdiction in relation to jus cogens crimes such as genocide, or the jurisdiction of the 
ICC if present in states party to the Rome Statute. It is to be noted the recent expression 
of concern by the ICJ in relation to states evading accountability for genocide:  
 
It is a matter for serious concern that at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is still 
for States to choose whether they consent to the Court adjudicating claims that they have 
committed genocide. It must be regarded as a very grave matter that a State should be in a 
position to shield from international judicial scrutiny any claim that might be made against 
it concerning genocide. A State so doing shows the world scant confidence that it would 
never, ever, commit genocide, one of the greatest crimes known.74
 
The Attorney-General’s refusal to issue a certificate would achieve the very antithesis of 
the Rome Statute’s ambitions, namely impunity for perpetrators of the serious crimes 
covered by art 5.  
                                                          
70 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 
December 1948, (1951) 78 UNTS 277, (entered into force 12 January 1951). 
71 Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth). 
72 Nulyarimma v Thompson [1999] FCA 1192, [18], [20], (Wilcox J): ‘I accept that the prohibition of 
genocide is a peremptory norm of customary international law, giving rise to a non-derogatable [sic] 
obligation by each nation State to the entire international community. This is an obligation independent of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It existed before the 
commencement of that Convention in January 1951, probably at least from the time of the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution in December 1946. I accept, also, that the obligation imposed by customary 
law on each nation State is to extradite or prosecute any person, found within its territory, who appears to 
have committed any of the acts cited in the definition of genocide set out in the Convention. It is generally 
accepted this definition reflects the concept of genocide, as understood in customary international law. … 
However, it is one thing to say Australia has an international legal obligation to prosecute or extradite a 
genocide suspect found within its territory, and that the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate to ensure 
that obligation is fulfilled; it is another thing to say that, without legislation to that effect, such a person 
may be put on trial for genocide before an Australian court. If this were the position, it would lead to the 
curious result that an international obligation incurred pursuant to customary law has greater domestic 
consequences than an obligation incurred, expressly and voluntarily, by Australia signing and ratifying an 
international convention. Ratification of a convention does not directly affect Australian domestic law 
unless and until implementing legislation is enacted. This seems to be the position even where the 
ratification has received Parliamentary approval, as in the case of the Genocide Convention’; see also 
Melinda Walker, ‘Upholding the Law v Maintaining Legality: Nulyarimma v Thompson’ (1999) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin, 81. 
73 International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth); International Criminal Court (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth). 
74 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Jurisdiction; Admissibility)  
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) [2006] ICJ (3 Feb) Joint Separate Opinion by Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma JJ, 65 [25]. 
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F     Position with Regard to Objections 
 
It remains to clarify the position in relation to objections to reservations and declarations. 
No objection has been made to the Australian declaration to the Rome Statute. The 
question is what is the significance of this? Under the general law of treaties the position 
with regard to objections is set out in arts 20–23 of the Vienna Convention. In regard to 
the acceptance of a reservation the Vienna Convention establishes that a state or 
international organisation has 12 months to raise an objection after which it is deemed to 
have accepted it.75 This gives some certainty to the status of the reserving party at the 
same time as permitting the objecting state or international organisation to consider the 
reservation and their position in regard thereto.76 A state that ratifies a treaty subsequent 
to a reservation or declaration of another signatory is taken to have accepted the 
reservation or declaration if it does not raise an objection at the time of ratification.77  
 
Article 20(3) of the Vienna Convention and draft guideline 2.8.7 of the ILC establish the 
position in relation to treaties that are constituent instruments establishing international 
organisations, such as the ICC: 
 
Article 20(3) When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and 
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ 
of that organization. 
 
The Vienna Convention does not elucidate what is a constituent instrument or what effect 
acceptance by a competent organ has on states.78 The special rapporteur in the 12th report 
concludes that art 20(3) of the Vienna Convention requires the constituent instrument of 
the organisation to expressly accept a reservation or declaration by ruling on the 
question79 but goes on to note that ‘[i]t is possible, however, to imagine cases in which 
the organ implicitly accepts the reservation and allows the candidate country to 
participate in the work of the organisation without formally ruling on the reservation.’80 
Where the constituent organ is yet to be established at the time of the reserving state’s 
ratification, draft guideline 2.8.10 proposes in relation to art 20(3) that in such a situation 
the reservation requires ‘the acceptance of all the States and international organizations 
concerned.’81
  
The ICC came into effective operation on 1 July 2002, the date of Australia’s declaration 
and ratification. As stated above it is possible to argue that if it is a reservation under art 
19(a) then it is not something that can be objected to or that requires an objection, it is 
simply prohibited. If, however, it is taken as something other than a prohibited 
reservation it may come within Rome Statute art 19(c) in which case art 20(3) of the 
Vienna Convention applies. The special rapporteur has stated in his 10th Report on 
reservations to treaties that art 19(c) only applies in cases where the treaty itself does not 
resolve the position on reservations and in cases not covered by arts 20(2) and (3) of the 
                                                          
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 2 May 1969, [1974] ATS 2, art 20(5) 
(entered into force 27 January 1980); see also Pellet, Twelfth Report, above n 66, [216]. 
76 Pellet, Twelfth Report, above n 66, [214]–[216]. 
77 Ibid [219]–[222]. 
78 Ibid [249]. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid [251] (citations omitted). 
81 Ibid [265]; states may still take a position on a reservation but it will have no legal effect: ibid [267]–[9]. 
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Convention.82 He goes on to state that a reservation expressly prohibited by a treaty 
cannot be validated on the basis of compatibility with the object and purpose.83
 
As reservations to the Rome Statute are prohibited, then no objection to a declaration 
determined to be effectively a reservation is required. Article 120 of the Rome Statute 
would exclude art 20(3) of the Vienna Convention and acceptances of reservations. The 
Rome Statute did envisage reservations and clearly aimed to prohibit them. However, 
when it comes to reservations in the form of disguised declarations the position is 
ambiguous. To consider the alternative: as neither the Assembly of States, the ICC nor 
the preparatory commission for the ICC have taken a position in regard to the Australian 
declaration (nor in respect of many of the declarations submitted by other states), and 
certainly they have not expressly accepted it, it can be argued the declaration has 
implicitly been accepted. That still would leave any states yet to ratify the Statute in a 
position to object,84 but because it is ultimately the competent organ’s position to decide 
then it is possible that Australia’s declaration has impliedly been accepted. 
 
In any event it would seem that given the position with regard to state practice and the 
lack of an explicit acceptance by the ICC, the state of Australia’s declaration is not as 
clear as is desirable. This is to be considered alongside the fact that the position in 
relation to treaties that set up international institutions – as is the case with the Rome 
Statute – and that have obligations affecting individual rights – such as human rights 
treaties – have been argued by the Human Rights Committee and others to have different 
consequences when it comes to objections to reservations.  
 
III     APPLICATION TO AUSTRALIA’S DECLARATION 
 
In applying the criteria discussed above and to answer the question ‘what is the legal 
status of the declaration made by Australia,’ one must first look to the substance of the 
declaration to determine whether it changes the legal effect of the Rome Statute and thus 
is prohibited as effectively a reservation (Art 19(a) of the Vienna Convention and art 120 
of the Rome Statute). If the conclusion to this is negative, it may still be appropriate to 
consider whether it undermines the ‘object and purpose’ of the Rome Statute. On this 
point paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Australian declaration present the greatest concern. As 
argued above the fact that no other state, or the ICC explicitly, given the nature of the 
Statute, have sought to object to the declaration does not mean it is acceptable. The Rome 
Statute requires that a state party ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’85 and ‘immediately take steps 
to arrest the person in question.’86 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the declaration by Australia 
assert the right of the Attorney-General to issue certificates, before a person can be 
arrested87 and surrendered to the ICC.88
 
                                                          
82 Pellet, Tenth Report, above n 42 [57]. 
83 Ibid [58]. 
84 Vienna Convention art 20(5); Pellet, Twelfth Report, above n 66, [216]. 
85 Rome Statute art 86. 
86 Rome Statute art 59. 
87 ICC Act 2002 (Cth) s 22. 
88 ICC Act 2002 (Cth) s 29. 
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The legal effect and obligations of Australia are modified by the Attorney-General’s 
exercise of an absolute discretion89 with the correspondent interpretation attributed to 
this under Australian law.  
 
The need for cooperation to be smooth and effective is vital to the function of the ICC, as 
it relies on states to perform the arrest, detention and enforcement aspects of the criminal 
process, having no direct enforcement powers itself. Part 9 of the Rome Statute deals 
with international cooperation and judicial assistance:  
 
Article 86 states: 
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with 
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
  
Article 88 states: 
States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for 
all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part. 
  
Further cooperation provisions include arts 93 and 54, the latter requiring that a state 
party act ‘immediately’ to arrest and surrender a person in relation to whom they may 
receive a request for provisional arrest. The amount of explicit detail in the Statute means 
that great consideration was given to the circumstances surrounding arrest and surrender 
and the operation of national law in this regard. Two examples are instructive: 
 
 Article 89(2) provides: 
Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a national court on the 
basis of the principle of ne bis in idem as provided in article 20, the requested State shall 
immediately consult with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on 
admissibility. If the case is admissible, the requested State shall proceed with the 
execution of the request. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may 
postpone the execution of the request for surrender of the person until the Court makes a 
determination on admissibility. 
 
This envisages that surrender may be objected to but only on specific grounds, namely ne 
bis in idem and admissibility. If admissibility has been determined then the State shall 
proceed with the request; postponement of the request is only contemplated if the 
admissibility determination has not been made. 
  
Again in the Rome Statute art 91(2) provides: 
 
In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of 
arrest has been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58, the request shall contain 
or be supported by: 
 (c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the 
requirements for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those 
requirements should not be more burdensome than those applicable to requests for 
extradition pursuant to treaties or arrangements between the requested State and other 
States and should, if possible, be less burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature 
of the Court.  
 
                                                          
89 ICC Act 2002 (Cth) ss 22, 29 
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It can be seen that steps required by national law should not be ‘burdensome’, given the 
nature of the Statute; if anything they should be less cumbersome than requests for 
extradition. It is instructive then to consider briefly what the position in Australia is in 
relation to extradition. The Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) provides for determination to be 
made by a Magistrate under s 19, which provides for detailed considerations:   
 
Section 16(2) provides: 
The Attorney-General shall not give the notice:  
(a)  unless the Attorney-General is of the opinion:  
(i)  that the person is an extraditable person in relation to the extradition country; and  
(ii) that, if the conduct of the person constituting the extradition offence, or any of the 
extradition offences, for which surrender of the person is sought, or equivalent 
conduct, had taken place in Australia at the time at which the extradition request was 
received, the conduct or the equivalent conduct would have constituted an extradition 
offence in relation to Australia; or  
(b) if the Attorney-General is of the opinion that there is an extradition objection in 
relation to the extradition offence, or all of the extradition offences, for which surrender 
of the person is sought.  
 
Nowhere in the Act does the Attorney-General have an absolute discretion. The 
Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Regulations 1998 provide in reg 7 for some 
ability of the Attorney-General to intervene, but the basis on which the discretion is 
exercised is delineated and not left to an absolute discretion:  
Reg 7... a person shall not be surrendered in relation to such an offence if the Attorney-
General is satisfied that by reason of ...  
(b) the accusation against the eligible person not having been made in good faith or in the 
interests of justice; or  
(c) any other sufficient cause ... it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be 
unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to surrender the eligible person.  
 
It can be seen that any decision of the Attorney-General must be justifiable within the 
constraints of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). This is not the case with the absolute 
discretion granted the Attorney-General under the International Criminal Court Act 2002 
(Cth) (‘ICC Act’) – by which Australia implemented the Rome Statute at a domestic level 
–  and the attempt at the limiting of review by the Courts. It is to be noted that the High 
Court in reviewing the exercise of an absolute discretion by ministers in the area of 
migration has taken the discretion to be wide and while not unfettered the Court will 
always consider jurisdictional error – it is not one to which natural justice or review is 
readily applicable.90 In view of this it is unlikely that the High Court would interfere with 
                                                          
90 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, holding Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474 
valid. Section 474 of that Act is similar in breadth to the provision in the ICC Act (Cth) s 181 setting out 
the circumstances of an appeal. Section 474(1) provides that: 
(1) A privative clause decision: 
(a) is final and conclusive; and 
(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or 
called in question in any court; and 
(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or 
certiorari in any court on any account. 
In the result, the Court unanimously rejected the ‘literal’ interpretation, affirming that the section would be 
invalid if, on the construction contended for by the plaintiff, it attempted to oust the jurisdiction of the High 
Court. All the judges held that the constitutional writs of prohibition and mandamus are available for 
jurisdictional error. It followed that s 474 could not be read as protecting from review decisions involving 
jurisdictional error, if only because any other interpretation would be in conflict with s 75(v) of the 
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the Attorney-General’s exercise of an absolute discretion. Further, the High Court in 
Australia will provide relief where an administrative decision is wrong in law,91 but has 
been reluctant to interfere in what are considered purely political decisions and ones that 
involve our relations with other nations.92  
 
The Attorney-General’s exercise of an absolute discretion is entrenched in the 
implementing legislation, the ICC Act, and is not circumscribed by any criteria for the 
exercise of the discretion: it remains an absolute discretion.93  
The ICC Act asserts the ultimate authority of the Attorney-General in s 181, which 
specifies: 
Attorney-General’s decisions in relation to certificates to be final 
181(1) Subject to any jurisdiction of the High Court under the Constitution, a decision 
by the Attorney-General to issue, or to refuse to issue, a certificate under s 22 or s 29: 
 (a) is final; and 
 (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in 
question; and 
 (c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari. 
Any jurisdiction of the High Court referred to in subsection (1) is exclusive of the 
jurisdiction of any other court. 
The discretion given to the Attorney-General under s 181 appears unconscionably broad. 
In Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd Kirby and Callinan JJ, referring to all Australian 
Parliaments, stated: ‘Absolute discretions are a form of tyranny.’94 The rule of law 
requires certainty in the law which is not provided by the legislature’s dispensation to 
one of its members a wide and apparently arbitrary discretionary authority. The broad 
discretion given to the Attorney-General is compounded when considered in the context 
of Australian judges being loathe to review matters pertaining to national security or 
matters involving political sensitivity.95 It seems the only constraints on s 181 are those 
imposed by s 75 of the Constitution.96 For s 75 to apply there must be a justiciable 
‘matter’ and a party must have standing. Naturally a person in relation to whom the 
Attorney-General exercises his discretion to arrest or surrender has an interest and 
therefore standing. However, were the Attorney-General to refuse to arrest or surrender a 
person, who would have standing then? Would there be a justiciable ‘matter’ for the High 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Constitution; see also Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 40, 88 (Spender 
J): ‘Faulty or illogical reasoning does not amount to jurisdictional error’; R v Mackellar; Ex parte Ratu 
(1977) 137 CLR 461; cf Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
91 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 72. 
92 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 138–9. 
93 ICC Act 2002 (Cth) ss 22, 29. 
94 Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478, 69–70. 
95 See, eg, Minister for the Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274; 
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for 
the Civil Service (1985) AC 374; A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publishers (Australia) Pty Ltd (‘Spycatcher 
Case’) (1988) 165 CLR 30; Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL v Commonwealth (2003) 126 FCR 
354. 
96 Section 75 of the Australian Constitution provides: ‘Original jurisdiction of High Court 
In all matters … 
(v) In which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the 
Commonwealth … the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.’  
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court to review? These hurdles aside it is improbable with such a wide discretion to 
conceive of grounds that would enable the decision to be reviewed.97
It is not the role of a national court to determine whether a declaration is in fact a 
reservation under a treaty. As a matter of international law the Australian legislature 
cannot, and is presumptuous to attempt to, exclude the ability of the ICC from exercising 
the right to determine whether the Rome Statute is being complied with by virtue of s 
181(1)(b) and (3). This section looks like an attempt to dictate the operation of the 
Statute in relation to Australia’s domestic implementation in a way that is utterly 
inconsistent with its international obligations by virtue of ratification of the Statute, 
particularly art 27. This fact is likely to bring the High Court of Australia into an 
unenviable position if s 181(3) ever has cause to be activated. 
 
The consequence of the Attorney-General exercising their discretion in regard to senior 
members of the government or the military has to be considered. Of considerable 
significance, as stated in the preamble of the Rome Statute, is the object of putting ‘an 
end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes.’ Article 27, which prohibits immunity for heads of 
government and other members of government which would attempt to exclude liability 
based on their official capacity, is a major object of the Statute. The ICC is concerned 
only with ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.’98 This is 
reinforced by the chief prosecutor’s statement: ‘The policy decision of the Office to focus 
its resources on the investigation and prosecution of those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious crimes has attracted strong support.’99  
 
In relation to the aspect of gravity, art 8(1) of the Rome Statute sets out the limits of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction ‘in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’. The ICC office of 
the prosecutor has indicated that the prosecutor will decline to open a case that is not of 
sufficient gravity. In this regard the deaths of thousands of civilians not hundreds or less 
is the likely target.100 In fact the ICC reinforces the Rome Statute preamble in setting out 
the mandate of the prosecutor’s office: ‘by conducting investigations and prosecutions, 
the Office contributes to the overall objective of the Court – to end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community…’101
 
With regards to the question of gravity, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC in Prosecutor 
v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo divided the issue of admissibility into consideration of two 
aspects: complementarity and gravity. With respect to gravity under art 17 the Pre Trial 
Chamber I has set a three part test: 
                                                          
97 See Spycatcher Case (1988) 165 CLR 30, 46–7 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and 
Gaudron J): ‘the right or interest asserted in the proceedings is to be classified as a governmental interest. 
As such, the action falls within the rule of international law which renders the claim unenforceable’. 
98 Rome Statute art 5(1). 
99 Summary of recommendations received during the first Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
UN ICC OTP (2003) < http://wwwold.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ph/ph1_conclusions.pdf> at 28 April 
2009. 
100 See also, Update on Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor (10 February 2006) 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html> at 10 July 2008.  
101 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor < http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp.html > ICC at 
28 April 2009. 
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1) the conduct was of either a ‘systematic or large-scale nature’ (‘social … alarm to 
the international community’ is here an important factor); and 
2) the person subject to prosecution was one of the ‘most senior leaders of the 
conduct under investigation.’ 
3) the third limb of the test pertains to determining who is a ‘most senior leader’.  
Here, the court will have regard to: 
i) the role played by the relevant person through acts or omissions when the State 
entities, organisations or armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or 
large-scale crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
ii) the role played by such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the 
overall commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in the relevant 
situation.102
 
At the JSCOT hearings the question was raised as to why the Australian implementing 
legislation failed to mention art 27.103 It is significant that the Australian legislation is 
unlike any of its western state counterparts, such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Canada. These states have implemented the Rome Statute with minimal legislation, 
adopting the Statute and Elements of Crime104 as they are. Australia is unique in its 
specificity in addressing each crime in detail, along with the elements of each offence, in 
line with paragraph 6 of the Australian declaration. The ICC Act runs to some 189 
sections and yet no mention is made of art 27. JSCOT in recommendation 8 suggested 
‘the Attorney-General review the legislation to ensure the responsibilities required under 
Article 27 of the Statute are fully met’.105 The Australian government response was only 
to note this recommendation, stating that Australian law makes no special provision for 
immunity of persons based on official capacity, excepting for those required under 
international law, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The 
government response also drew attention to art 98 of the Rome Statute and immunity 
given to persons from third states, which it had reflected in s 12 of the ICC Act.106 
Notwithstanding this interpretation, the importance of art 27 to the raison d’être of the 
Statute demands a statement to this effect in the implementing legislation, given the 
thoroughness the implementing legislation accorded to every other aspect of the Rome 
Statute.  
 
                                                          
102 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants 
of Arrest, Article 58 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ICC, [64] Un Doc ICC-01/04-01/07 (2006). 
103 ‘That provision is not reflected in the draft Australian legislation and so a question arises whether, by 
virtue of its omission, an official could claim immunity in Australian proceedings. Amnesty International 
Australia believes no official should be immune from criminal responsibility for acts contravening the 
statute and that article 27 should be embodied in Australian legislation. … The government, in omitting 
article 27 from the legislation, may take the view that, because the statute renders the crimes specified in it 
enforceable, they could not be characterised as official acts. This may be so but it is undesirable for that 
aspect to be left in doubt – but it would, in any event, leave an official immune by virtue of his status and 
thus exempt from liability whilst he remains an official.  … so far as Australian legislation is concerned, 
we are troubled by the omission of any provision along the lines of art 27’: John Greenwell, Reference: 
Statute for an International Criminal Court, JSCOT Official Committee Hansard: JSCOT (April 27 2002) 
272, 273–6.  
104 A Guide to the report of the Preparatory Commission, ICC, [10] – [11] UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 
(2000). 
105 JSCOT, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 45: The Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Recommendation 8 (2002) 84.  
106 See ‘Recommendation 8’ in: Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Inquiry 
into the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Federal Parliament, 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/governmentresponses/45th.pdf> at 28 April 2009. 
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It is suggested that not only does the declaration amount to a hindrance to the smooth 
cooperation with the ICC, but it changes the Rome Statute’s legal effect, resulting in 
vagueness; at the very least it is an unnecessary obstacle, inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Statute. As such it carries the possibility of being construed by the ICC 
(which would have power to form a view on this as a competence de la competence 
issue), as a reservation prohibited by art 120.107 The interpretation of the Australian 
declaration as in fact a reservation has also been made by Amnesty International: 
 
Amnesty International considers that although the Australian unilateral statement has 
been incorporated into domestic law, it is contrary to some provisions of the Rome 
Statute and is therefore inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under the Statute. 
Amnesty International considers that this statement amounts to a prohibited reservation 
and Australia should, therefore, withdraw it.108
 
While the principle of complementarity means the domestic jurisdiction maintains 
dominance it cannot be forgotten that ultimately it is for an assessment at the 
international level to determine complementarity – particularly if the Attorney-General 
refuses consent under s 22 or s 29 of the ICC Act. Section 15 of the ICC Act reminds the 
Attorney-General of the power under art 87(7) of the Rome Statute to refer 
‘unwillingness of parties to investigate, prosecute or try an offender to the Assembly of 
States Parties or to the Security Council’, and while it looks to support the operation of 
the ICC it seems inconsistent with the power given to the Attorney-General to prevent 
arrest or surrender under the Statute. 
 
Commentators have noted the importance of ensuring the effective operation of the ICC 
through appropriate and workable state implementing legislation: 
 
It is of little assistance to humankind for states to pay lip service to global ideals by 
becoming parties to international treaties and then being unable to give effect to their 
provisions because of technical reasons.109
 
Katz110 has noted that in the South African implementing legislation111 there appears to 
be a technical oversight in regard to the arrest and surrender requirements. In Australia 
there is a clear indication from the JSCOT hearings and the declaration that some 
‘reserve’ exists in the outright support for the smooth and efficient operation of the ICC 
by the imposition of the unnecessary hurdle of the Attorney-General’s exercise of an 
absolute discretion. 
 
A     The Consequences of Invalidity 
 
So what then is the effect of the declaration, if it really is in the nature of a prohibited 
reservation? In a desire to encourage participation in the Rome Statute and in fact 
generally by states in multilateral treaties where there is an invalid reservation, the usual 
practice is to consider the reservation (declaration) as null and void while the state is still 
                                                          
107 Triggs, above n 15, states: ‘While these provisions appear to be valid under the Constitution, it remains 
open to the judgment of the ICC itself whether a State party “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution” under Article 17 of the Rome Statute’ at 16. 
108 Amnesty International, above n 14, 30. 
109 Anton Katz, ‘An Act of Transformation. The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national 
law in South Africa’, (2003) 12(4) African Security Review 27, 29. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act (2002) South Africa. 
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taken to be a party to the treaty.112 In fact this was spelt out by those states objecting to 
the ‘effective reservation’ by Uruguay to the Rome Statute.113
 
If the Australian declaration were invalid, whether as a reservation prohibited by art 120 
of the Rome Statute, or as a conditional interpretative declaration, or as conflicting with 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute pursuant to art 19(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, there are a number of possible outcomes. The 18th meeting of chairpersons 
of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies reported on reservations in paragraph seven as 
follows: 
 
The consequence that applies in a particular situation depends on the intention of the 
State at the time it enters its reservation. This intention must be identified during a 
serious examination of the available information, with the presumption, which may be 
refuted, that the State would prefer to remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of 
the reservation, rather than being excluded.114  
 
The latter was the approach adopted by the ECHR in Belilos,115 in which the court 
decided that Switzerland’s desire to remain a party to the convention was stronger than 
its desire to maintain the reservation. Another approach is to follow the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment No 24, whereby such invalid reservations are 
severable and of no effect. It is important in this context that the invalid declaration is 
severable from the consent to be bound by Australia. This could raise considerable 
debate in the Australian political context given the submissions before JSCOT and the 
perceived threat to sovereignty caused by the ICC jurisdiction: if the declaration were 
invalid, this would alter the operation in Australia of the Rome Statute, and would 
demand substantial changes for the implementing legislation, altering the whole scheme 
of operation. In such a case it may be argued that respect for state sovereignty would 
enable Australia to reconsider its position, with possible withdrawal as an option.116 In 
the unlikely event that this position arose the outcome would be determined by 
Australia’s political climate at the time. In any event the overwhelming desire to 
encourage universal state participation is likely to result in the ICC taking a pragmatic 
approach that encourages Australia’s continued participation in the ICC.  
 
This preliminary perspective on the importance of Australia’s declaration has 
significance when it comes to consideration of the operation of the complementarity 
principle. If the Attorney-General acts in a manner inconsistent with Australia’s 
                                                          
112 Vienna Convention art 21(3); see also Pellet, Meeting with Human Rights Bodies above, n 61 [8], [13]. 
113 See, eg, Germany above n 67. Typical of the objections is Denmark’s:  
"This objection does not preclude the entry into force of the Statute between Denmark and the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay. The Statute will be effective between the two states, without the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay benefiting from its reservations", CN.695.2002.TREATIES-30 of 9 July 2002 (Uruguay: 
Ratification). 
114 Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN HRI, 18th mtg of chairpersons of HR 
treaty bodies [7] UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/5 (2006). 
115 See Belilos (1988) 10 EHRR 466 [60]: ‘In short, the declaration in question does not satisfy two of the 
requirements of Article 64 (art. 64) of the Convention, with the result that it must be held to be invalid. At 
the same time, it is beyond doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention 
irrespective of the validity of the declaration. Moreover, the Swiss Government recognised the Court’s 
competence to determine the latter issue, which they argued before it. The Government’s preliminary 
objection must therefore be rejected.’ 
116 Rome Statute art 127. 
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obligations under the Rome Statute then that will involve Australia’s responsibility under 
international law even if the Attorney-General is acting consistently with the declaration. 
 
IV     COMPLEMENTARITY – UNWILLINGNESS AND INABILITY 
 
The complementarity principles contained in art 17(1)(a) and (b) have two main aspects – 
1) unwillingness and 2) inability, to investigate, prosecute or try an offender. 
 
The Situation in Darfur: Prosecutor’s Application under art 58(7) of the Rome Statute 
provided the first test of the complementarity principle.117 The military in Sudan are 
given immunity from prosecution for crimes. The authorities in Darfur say they are ready 
and willing to investigate and prosecute the two individuals of concern, pointing to the 
fact that one of the individuals has been charged. Of significance, despite the breakdown 
of the court system in Sudan, inability has not been a ground relied on by the prosecutor. 
Rather, the fact the State of Sudan has failed to prosecute the individuals has made 
unwillingness the basis of the application: 
 
The investigations being carried out by the relevant Sudanese authorities do not cover the 
same persons and the same conduct which are the subject of the Prosecution’s case. … 
Although investigations in the Sudan do involve Ali Kushayb, they are not in respect of 
the same incidents and they encompass a significantly narrower range of conduct. 
Having analysed all of the relevant information, the Prosecutor has concluded that the 
Sudanese authorities have not investigated or prosecuted the case which is the subject of 
the Application. On this basis, the Prosecution has concluded that the case is admissible. 
This assessment is not a judgement on the Sudanese justice system as a whole.118
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC in Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo divided the 
issue of admissibility into consideration of two aspects: complementarity and gravity.119 
In relation to complementarity the Court emphasised the need to find a positive 
‘unwillingness’ or a genuine ‘inability’ to carry through with a matter. For a matter to be 
inadmissible the state proceedings must cover both the person and the conduct of concern 
to the Court.120 Charges must therefore reflect the true nature of the specific conduct. In 
the US, for instance, commentators have argued that military personnel often do not have 
the extent of conduct reflected in the nature of the charges laid before military courts-
martial.121  
  
If ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ provide possible grounds for ICC intervention, there are a 
number of stringent processes that must be exhausted before the matter is admissible for 
trial. The prosecutor of the ICC has to first bring the matter before a pre-trial chamber of 
three judges who have to decide by a majority122 that there is a reasonable basis for the 
prosecutor to undertake further investigations in the matter and that it falls within the 
                                                          
117 Situation in Darfur, the Sudan: Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58(7) (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 
ICC, [251], [253]–[67] UN Doc ICC-02/05-56 (2007). 
118 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutor Opening Remarks: Situation in Darfur’ (Press Release, 27 
February 2007). 
119 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants 
of Arrest, Article 58 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ICC, [29] Un Doc ICC-01/04-01/07 (2006). 
120 Ibid [31]. 
121 Thomas Wayde Pittman and Matthew Heaphy ‘Does the United States Really Prosecute Its Service 
Members for War Crimes? Implications for Complementarity before the International Criminal Court’ 
(2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 165, 167. 
122 Rome Statute art 57(2). 
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Court’s investigative jurisdiction.123 A refusal by the pre-trial chamber to authorise the 
investigation does not prevent the prosecutor presenting new facts or evidence at a latter 
date for reconsideration.124 The Security Council has the ability to step in and prevent an 
investigation or prosecution from proceeding for a period of 12 months by a resolution 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and this can be ongoing through 
repetition of the process.125  
 
Upon the prosecutor’s initiation of an investigation he may confidentially inform the 
state, and a state within one month of this notification can inform the Court that it is 
undertaking or has undertaken the investigation, in which case the prosecutor can defer to 
the state’s investigation with the opportunity for ongoing review of the progress, or the 
prosecutor can request the pre-trial chamber to authorise his investigation.126 An appeal 
against the pre-trial chamber’s decision can be made by the state or the prosecutor in 
accordance with art 82 of the Rome Statute.127 Once the prosecutor’s investigations are 
complete, if the prosecutor decides there are sufficient grounds to continue he may seek a 
ruling from the trial chamber regarding questions of admissibility or jurisdiction.128 Any 
challenges to jurisdiction or admissibility prior to the confirmation of charges are heard 
by the pre-trial chamber; after the accused is charged they are heard by the trial chamber 
and must be raised by a state at the earliest opportunity.129 A challenge can only be made 
once, although there is a right of appeal to the appeals chamber.130 The trial chamber has 
the ability under art 19(1) to satisfy itself regarding jurisdiction and admissibility before 
hearing a case. It is to be noted in regard to the pre-trial chamber that judges are 
appointed through an independent process and are not from the same pool of 18 judges 
that are selected to sit on the trial chamber.131
 
A    Unwillingness 
 
The first aspect of complementarity (unwillingness) presents greater concerns than the 
second (inability) in relation to the Australian declaration as it is largely determined by 
the political will of the national state. The submissions before JSCOT indicate a degree 
of nervousness about the admissibility of a case before the ICC on the basis of the 
subjective term ‘unwillingness’. Some assistance as to what actions are likely to be 
interpreted as ‘unwillingness’ is given by art 17(2)(a)-(c). These include: proceedings 
undertaken in a way that would be interpreted by the ICC as being inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person to justice, include attempting to ‘shield’ a person; unjustified 
delays consistent with an attempt to avoid justice; lack of independent or impartial 
dealing. Thus where the Australian authorities have undertaken normal legal 
investigations and proceedings with a view to prosecute a person for breach of a crime 
with which the Rome Statute deals and there is found to be no prima facie case, or if tried 
the person is found not guilty, the matter is likely to end there. However, if Australia did 
not proceed through the national channels in dealing with an alleged suspect and the 
charges did not cover the person or the conduct of concern and the Attorney-General 
                                                          
123 Rome Statute art 15. 
124 Rome Statute art 15(5). 
125 Rome Statute art 16. 
126 Rome Statute art 18. 
127 Rome Statute art 18(4). 
128 Rome Statute art 19(3). 
129 Rome Statute art 19(5). 
130 Rome Statute art 19(6). 
131 Rome Statute art 36(1).  
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employed the absolute discretion to protect senior government officials or military from 
arrest and surrender to the ICC then unwillingness would be an issue for the ICC. 
 
B     Inability 
 
The second aspect of complementarity, inability, relates to situations where legal rather 
than political obstacles prevent Australia prosecuting. Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute 
suggests that inability arises ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of a 
national judicial system.’ This could include such procedural concerns as inability of the 
investigative arm to function effectively due to issues with investigative powers or 
personnel. It may also include domestic state laws that provide immunity. However, it 
appears to relate mainly to failure of institutions, such as courts, due to internal state 
conflicts or other crises. In this event ‘inability’ is not as likely to be a major concern in 
the Australian context as is the concept of ‘unwillingness’.132
 
C     Australia’s Willingness 
 
Notwithstanding the hurdle of the prosecutor, if a case were considered to be admissible 
after hearing by the pre-trial chamber and the Attorney-General refused to issue a 
certificate for the person, or persons, to be arrested under s 22 of the ICC Act then he or 
she is equally unlikely to issue a certificate for surrender under s 29. Professor 
McCormack’s statement in response to a question from Senator Bartlett during the 
JSCOT hearings is indicative: 
 
Mr Bartlett – What if it came to a real showdown and they insisted that there was a case 
against an Australian who we were unwilling to prosecute? What happens in the case of a 
stand-off if any party simply refuses to hand over someone for prosecution? 
Prof. McCormack – The critical question is who has custody, isn’t it? If we have custody 
of the individual and we say, ‘You can all go and get stuffed,’ then we will be criticised 
by the international community, and that is not an utterly uncommon experience in our 
case at the moment.133
 
The object of the Rome Statute is to have states undertake at the national level the 
prosecutions of crimes covered by the Statute and it is only if and when this is not done 
that the ICC steps in as a back up to ensure there is no escape for such offenders and no 
longer impunity internationally. The cooperation of the state in this process is essential to 
the success of the ICC. The ICC Act gives the Attorney-General the prime role of liaising 
with and facilitating the ICC in its interactions within the domestic jurisdiction of 
Australia. There is an assumption, implicit in the operation of the ICC Act that it would 
never be the Attorney-General who would be the person of interest to the ICC and yet it 
is with leaders of states and organisations that the ICC, by its explicit agenda, is 
concerned.134   
                                                          
132 Inability would not include situations referred to in the ICC Act where Australia may be duty bound by 
bilateral or other international agreements with a foreign state in which a conflict of interest may occur. 
Section 12 of the ICC Act refers to the need for the Attorney-General to ‘postpone the execution of the 
request unless and until the foreign country has made the necessary waiver or given the necessary consent’. 
To this extent Australia is not free to determine our position if we have obligations to a foreign country 
under international law; see also Rome Statute art 98. 
133 JSCOT, Reference: Statute for an International Criminal Court, Official Committee Hansard (9 April 
2002) 257. 
134 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, above n 104, [63]: the Court affirmed the prosecutor’s policy of 
pursuing ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’. 
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Provision should have been made in the ICC Act for an independent authority, such as 
the Commonwealth director of public prosecutions (DPP), to liaise with the ICC in 
situations where high level members of government are under investigation.135 By giving 
the role to the Attorney-General it cannot help but give the operation of the ICC Act a 
political flavour. The office of the Attorney-General is not independent of the 
government of the day in the way that the office of the DPP is. It has been noted by one 
commentator that:  
 
While it is highly improbable that an Attorney-General would permit prosecutions against 
members of his own government or officers of the defence forces, it becomes possible, for 
example, for any subsequent government to prosecute those who were responsible for any war 
crimes that might have been committed in the recent conflict in Iraq.136  
 
Given the position in Australia, which mirrors that of the USA,137 with respect to the 
desire to maintain control over its own national military members and a policy of not 
subjecting them to prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction, it is unlikely any Australian 
Attorney-General would consent to such prosecution. Refusal by an Attorney-General to 
issue a certificate in such a case may be exactly the type of “unwillingness” that art 17 of 
the Rome Statute is designed to address. When it comes to senior political leaders, 
irrespective of party political persuasions, government members will always be slow to 
subject one of their number, even if from the opposition party, to such prosecutions, on 
the basis of a desire of reciprocity; to not be so subject themselves when in opposition. 
 
It is submitted that what the ICC Act means for willingness then is that the very 
subjective non-contestable discretion of the Attorney-General will mean the ICC can 
never bring to account the senior leaders of both the government and the military of 
Australia, the very type of persons to whom the Statute is intended to cover, while they 
remain within Australian territory, Article 27 of the Statute enunciates this position 
clearly, and stresses that immunities attaching to the official position of a person, both 
under national and international law, will not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
ICC. It is of significance that this point was raised in the hearings before the JSCOT and 
the lack of provision in the implementing legislation addressing art 27 was noted but not 
addressed as discussed previously.138 Perhaps the observations of Professor McCormack 
best summarise the realities of the Australian position: 
 
The fact is that the International Criminal Court will be as subject to international 
political reality as any other multilateral institution in existence at the moment. By that I 
mean that it will be almost impossible for the court to prosecute an individual national of 
one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The prospect of the court 
                                                          
135 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) is an independent prosecuting agency 
established under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) (‘DPP Act’) and the director is 
appointed for seven years. The office is independent of the Attorney-General and the political processes.  
The Attorney-General is responsible to Parliament for the Commonwealth criminal justice system and 
decisions made by the director of public prosecutions. Under s 8 of the DPP Act, the Attorney-General has 
power to issue guidelines and directions to the DPP. However, that can only be done after there has been 
consultation between the Attorney-General and the DPP. 
136 Triggs, above n 15, 523.  
137 See generally, Remigius Chibueze, ‘United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A 
Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom”’ (2003) 9 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 
19, 36–46. 
138 JSCOT, above n 105.  
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being able to try Chinese officials for the one-child policy or US service men and women 
for alleged violations of the statute committed in Europe, or wherever else in the world, 
is extremely remote because of the political realities. It would be naive of me as an 
international lawyer to try and suggest that all we look at is legal technicalities. The court 
is not going to be able to deal with everything because it is going to be subject to that.139
 
This political reality creates an unhappy bedfellow for an instrument that attempts to gain 
respect as an impartial international judicial organ. The role of gatekeepers such as the 
chief prosecutor of the ICC and the Attorney-General of Australia are pivotal to the 
effectiveness of the ICC. In this regard the chief prosecutor’s role is somewhat 
unenviable and was certainly the subject of a great deal of contention during the Rome 
negotiations.140  
 
V     GATEKEEPERS 
 
A     The ICC Chief Prosecutor’s Role 
 
One of the major concerns of states in the establishment of the ICC was the power given 
to the prosecutor. To be a legitimate and powerful institution the prosecutor needs to be 
independent. Alexander Downer, former Australian Foreign Minister, was concerned that 
the ICC’s jurisdiction not be triggered other than by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations or a state party.141 Ultimately this was not to be. 
At the Rome negotiations the Security Council permanent members, except for the 
United Kingdom,142 saw the prosecutor’s power to initiate an investigation as giving 
away too much power and something that could politicise the office of the prosecutor. It 
is hard to see how this argument sustains itself, given that the purpose of the ICC is to 
prosecute senior political and military leaders, amongst others, for the most serious 
breaches of international law: an inherently politicised role. The relationship between the 
ICC and the Security Council was resolved during the Rome negotiations as a result of a 
compromise suggested by the Singaporean delegates. This compromise enables the 
Security Council to maintain a degree of control by passing a resolution to suspend a 
prosecution for 12 months.143  
 
It was perhaps fortunate that the position of the permanent members of the Security 
Council was overridden, providing a greater legitimacy for the ICC before the 
international community by enabling three possible avenues for matters to be bought 
                                                          
139 JSCOT, above n 135, 252. 
140 Bellamy and Hanson, above n 6.  
141 Ibid 418; see also Lamberto Dini, (Speech delivered at the Conference organised by ‘Non c’è pace 
senza giustizia’ on the occasion of the opening of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference for the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 11 June 1998): ‘Moreover, it is necessary to 
oppose all those proposals that can compromise the action of the Prosecutor, restricting his autonomy 
excessively and dangerously. Another issue is whether the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction must be 
submitted to the prior consensus of the State. But the future of an international criminal Court is linked first 
and foremost to the preliminary acceptance of its competence and not to a subsequent acceptance; a choice 
in this sense would risk compromising the action of the jurisdictional body. Moreover, it is necessary to 
find a balanced solution to the problem of the relations with the Security Council, in order to prevent the 
Court from acting exclusively upon its authorisation. Finally, the obligations of juridical cooperation and 
assistance which rest with the States constitute another element on which the future Court's capability to 
operate lies. It is on this very collaboration that we must insist, in order to prevent this exercise of 
jurisdiction from lacking effectiveness.’ 
142 Bellamy and Hanson, above n 6, 429. 
143 Rome Statute art 16; see also Bellamy and Hanson, above n 6, 430.  
 30
before the court. These are: at the recommendation of the Security Council,144 State 
parties,145 or the prosecutor146 (if the pre-trial chamber is satisfied that the prosecutor’s 
investigations establish a serious and impartial case). Even individuals can make referrals 
to the prosecutor for consideration and the prosecutor can exercise his proprio motu 
powers in relation thereto.147 In May 2008, the prosecutor received 1732 such 
communications from 103 different countries, 16 of which originated in Australia.148
  
B    The Australian Attorney-General’s Role 
 
The role of the Attorney-General as gatekeeper has to be considered seriously in the 
context of Australia’s declaration regarding the required approval of the Attorney-
General. The Attorney-General is a senior member of government and as such is at least 
technically someone to whom the Rome Statute could apply. While the Attorney-General 
is a member of the executive and legislative branch, and a person held in high regard, as 
are most senior military and civil leaders of Australian society, he or she is subject to the 
rule of law and needs to be seen to be so. In this regard some commentators do not see an 
issue - if such persons were to breach the laws of the Commonwealth they would be 
subject to those laws.149 Others, however, remain unconvinced. The possibility of senior 
political figures breaching the laws that form the jurisdictional basis of the ICC is not a 
farfetched possibility when one considers this commentary of senior Australian QC 
Julian Burnside: 
 
As part of the process of implementing the International Criminal Court regime, 
Australia has introduced into its own domestic law a series of offences which mirror 
precisely the offences over which the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction. So, 
for the first time since Federation, the Commonwealth of Australia now recognises 
genocide as a crime and now recognises various war crimes. The Australian Criminal 
Code also recognises various acts as constituting crimes against humanity.150
 
Burnside then referred to s 268.12151 of the Criminal Code (Cth) 1995, which establishes 
as a crime against humanity imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty under certain 
circumstances in violation of arts 9, 14 and 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                          
144 Rome Statute art 13(b). 
145 Rome Statute art 14(1). 
146 Rome Statute art 15. 
147 Rome Statute art 15. 
148 See, eg, Update On Communications Received By The Office Of The Prosecutor Of The ICC The 
Office of Prosecutor, < http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_2006.pdf> at 20 May 2008. 
149 ‘It is inconceivable that the Australian government would forbid its own law enforcement agencies from 
investigating crimes covered by the Rome Statute. … Such a situation would only come about if the 
Australian government chose to disregard entirely its own domestic legal obligations – an unlikely 
development’: Bellamy and Hanson, above n 6, 431. 
150 See speech reported by Margo Kingston, ‘Australian Crimes Against Humanity’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 8 July 2003. 
151 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 268.12: Crime against humanity – imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty:  
(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:  
(a) the perpetrator imprisons one or more persons or otherwise severely deprives one or more persons of 
physical liberty; and  
(b) the perpetrator's conduct violates art 9, 14 or 15 of the Covenant; and  
(c) the perpetrator's conduct is committed intentionally or knowingly as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Penalty: Imprisonment for 17 years. 
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Political Rights (ICCPR). He proceeded to argue that the practice of mandatory detention 
as carried out by the Howard Government breached the elements of s 268.12:  
 
Australia’s system of mandatory, indefinite detention appears to satisfy each of the 
elements of that crime. Australia imprisons asylum-seekers. The United Nations Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention has found that the system violates Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
Their conduct is intentional, and is part of a systematic attack directed against those who 
arrive in Australia without papers and seek asylum. They can readily be regarded as a 
‘civilian population’. 
 
A simple analysis of the criminal code therefore suggests that senior ministers of the 
Australian government, specifically Mr Ruddock, senator Vanstone before him, Mr 
Andrews, and Mr Howard are guilty of crimes against humanity by virtue of their 
imprisonment of asylum-seekers. The prospect of their being prosecuted is remote, 
because the federal Attorney-General (presently Mr Ruddock) is the only person who can 
bring charges under these provisions.152  
 
This is not the first time in Australia that accusations of genocide or other serious crimes 
have been directed at senior government leadership. In the case of Nulyarimma v 
Thompson,153 a case brought before the Australian Federal Court, the facts alleged that 
the Prime Minister, the deputy Prime Minister, a senator and member of the House of 
Representatives, acting in their official capacities, in supporting the Commonwealth 
Government’s ‘Ten Point Plan’ and the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth) had 
committed the criminal offence of genocide. The matter was eventually heard by a Full 
Court of the Federal Court. The claim alleged that the actions of the named government 
officials relating to native title and the listing of World Heritage sites were an act of 
genocide towards the Aboriginal people of Australia. The applicants contended, 
unsuccessfully, the universal crime of genocide had been incorporated as part of the 
common law of Australia and so without the need for legislation gave rise to criminal 
liability for acts of genocide (wherever committed), which could be tried in a national 
court of Australia.154
 
Other serious accusations of genocide have been made against Australian public officials 
for their actions in forcibly removing Aboriginal children from their parents. While the 
newly elected Labor Government, as one of its first official actions in 2008, apologised 
to what has been labelled ‘The Stolen Generation’, the government is denying any 
wrongdoing that would entitle the people affected to compensation. Despite this in 2007 
the South Australian Supreme Court in a landmark case was the first Court to award 
compensation.155 A major national inquiry resulted in the ‘Bringing them Home’ Report 
produced in 1997; it found that many members of government had practised a culture of 
denial and that the forcible removal of indigenous children was a gross violation of 
human rights and an act of genocide contrary to the Convention on Genocide.156 
                                                          
152 Julian Burnside, Watching Brief: Reflections on Human Rights, Law, and Justice (2007) 29. 
153 Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153. 
154 Andrew D Mitchell, ‘Genocide, Human Rights Implementation and the Relationship between 
International and Domestic Law: Nulyarimma v Thompson’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 
15.  
155 Trevorrow v State of South Australia (2007) 98 SASR 136. 
156 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing them home: The ‘Stolen Children’ Report 
(1997); Sue Stanton, ‘Time for Truth: Speaking the Unspeakable – Genocide and Apartheid in the “Lucky” 
Country’ (1999) 14 Australian Humanities Review 
<http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-July-1999/stanton.html> at 22 May 2009. 
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However, as the Court held in the Nulyarimma case the crime of genocide was not 
punishable under Australian law on the basis of the transformation principle, despite the 
Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth) which acknowledged Australia’s ratification of the 
Convention on Genocide.157  
 
These observations are made without any disrespect for the office of Attorney-General; 
however, one can never know what future times will bring to this office. The ICC Act 
places reliance on people in the executive political leadership to do the right thing and act 
in the right way. The Rome Statute, above all else, takes aim at those in positions of high 
authority. As noted in Professor McCormack’s statement the Rome Statute risks very 
reasonable accusations of being a tool of the West or in other circumstances a mechanism 
for selectivity.158
 
VI    CONCLUSION 
 
The question arises if the Rome Statute is designed to deal with the most senior 
leadership in perpetrating the four crimes under its jurisdiction –  genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity159 and crimes of aggression (yet to be defined) – then by its very 
nature its operation will have political implications. The Australian legislation demands 
that the ICC, when seeking assistance in Australia, operate through the absolute 
discretion of the Attorney-General, one of our senior political leaders, thus politicising 
the process domestically. Even more concerning is the attempt in the ICC Act to remove 
any possibility of review of the Attorney-General’s actions except by the Australian High 
Court.  
 
The 2007 Labor Government has indicated a desire to engage with the United Nations in 
a spirit of cooperation.160 Australia’s human rights record stands to improve.161 The 
opportunity now exists: and the Australian Government should withdraw the Australian 
declaration to the Rome Statute in recognition of this renewed spirit of cooperation and 
accordingly amend the ICC Act. Australia would be given a strengthened voice at the 
international level if it was to do this, indicating a clear support for the ICC and a 
willingness not to see such serious crimes go unpunished no matter who has committed 
them.  
 
                                                          
157 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 
December 1948, (1951) 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951). 
158 JSCOT, Reference, above n 135; see also Wasil Ali, ‘Sudan to behead any person attempting to 
extradite Darfur suspects’, Sudan Tribune (Sudan) 2 March 2007: ‘Taha stated that if the ICC wants to try 
criminals committing war crimes then it needs to start with US president George Bush and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair for using weapons of mass destruction and phosphorous bombs in Iraq, southern 
Lebanon and Afghanistan. He pointed out that the ICC accuses his government of “burning straw huts 
while Bush and Blair burned towns with their fighter jets.”’ 
159 Rome Statute art 7; see Bellamy and Hanson above, n 6, 427. 
160 See, eg, Lindsay Tanner, Australian Labor: Making Australia a Good International Citizen (2008) 
Lindsay Tanner <http://www.lindsaytanner.com/pcards/pcard3.html> at 28 April 2009. 
161 See generally Charlesworth et al, above n 5, 71–82; Triggs, above n 15. 
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